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THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE FAA AND PATCO:
CONFLICTING VIEWS
NAJEEB

E. HALABY*

The following articles deal with the legal and public policy
issues involved in the recent dispute between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO), which resulted in the dismissal of over 11,000 controllers. J. E. Murdock III and Lee
Arnold, General Counsel for the FAA spell out the position of
the FAA while Mitchell Notis, Staff Counsel for the American
Federation of Government Employees outlines PATCO's side
of the dispute. In addition Beverly Shaffer of Emory University presents an analysis of the Federal Labor Relations Authority procedures available for the resolution of disputes concerning government employees.
The purpose of this introduction is to provide an historical
background of the origin and growth of the dispute to familiarize the reader with the environment out of which the conflict grew. It also attempts to clarify the legal and public policy issues involved in the dispute to provide the reader with a
common framework for considering the subsequent articles.
The strike by air traffic controllers against their employer,
the FAA, was in the making for twenty years. The origin and
growth of the dispute may be traced through the following
* A. B. Stanford, 1937, J.D. Yale, 1940. Mr. Halaby was in private practice with
the law firm of O'Melveny & Meyers, served as FAA Administrator from 1961-1965,
served as Chairman of the Board, Pan American World Airways from 1970-72 and
now heads his own venture capital firm.
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chronology:
January 1962

January 1968

July 1968
January 1969

June-July 1969

October 1969

January 1970

March 1970

May 1970

President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 permitting organization of Government employees into unions but without the right to strike.
New York air traffic controllers formed
PATCO and recruited over 5,000 FAA employees in its first year.
PATCO conducted its first slowdown.
The Civil Service Commission ruled
PATCO was an employee organization; at
the same time, the FAA agreed to permit
a voluntary payroll deduction plan for
payment of PATCO dues.
A work stoppage led by PATCO caused
the FAA to suspend eighty controllers and
terminate the dues withholding policy.
President Nixon issued Executive Order
11491, replacing Executive Order 10988,
giving the Labor Department authority to
grant exclusive recognition to Government
unions.
The Air Traffic Controllers Career Committee, made up of private citizens and
chaired by John Corson, submitted its report to the Secretary of Transportation.
The report called for improvement of
working conditions and management practices. It also urged legislation permitting
early retirement of controllers.
3,000 PATCO members went on strike,
leading to the issuance of contempt citations by the courts. The FAA suspended
1,000 controllers and fired 52 for their role
in the strike.
The Airport and Airway Development and
Revenue Acts of 1970 provided a trust
fund to modernize air traffic control and
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airport systems.
The FAA reinstated the controllers dismissed in the 1970 strike.
President Nixon signed into law the Air
May 1972
Traffic Controllers Career Program Act
providing for early retirement and other
benefits.
PATCO was certified by the Department
October 1972
of Labor as the exclusive representative of
more than 18,000 tower and center controllers.
May-June 1978
PATCO staged intermittent slowdowns to
protest the refusal of U.S. flag carriers to
provide controllers with free overseas
familiarization flights.
PATCO distributed a strike plan to its
April 1980
members.
August 1981
PATCO members went on strike against
the FAA.
The national airspace system is a cooperative one. It is absolutely dependent on collaboration between pilots, controllers, mechanics, technicians, airport operators and others. The
United States system of air traffic control (the System) is the
most mechanized, computerized, and probably the safest in
the world. Yet, it is fully dependent on the men and women
who operate it. The System underwent a rapid and broad
modernization in the early 1960s. For the past decade or so,
however, major technological improvements and replacements
have been slow and have widened the gap between the controllers' expectations and the realization of a fully reliable and
efficient System.
The impact of automation on the controller has been both
benign, as technogical advances have relieved the controller of
some boring duties, and malign in failing to meet promises of
more perfect computers and communications equipment. Situated in windowless spaces, huddled over impersonal radars,
and commuting daily to Federal buildings, the controller is
isolated by this automation from the airman, the airport and
February 1972
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the airplane. Only through the eye of the radar, and through
the very high frequency communications in the ear, is the controller relieved from his isolation. He is simultaneously indispensable, but, "out of it." He feels an intense sense of responsibility for the safety of passengers in the skies, which often
leads him to believe he is in fact operating the airplane. Such
an impression can annoy the grizzled captain in command.
Relations between PATCO and the pilots' union are more
hostile than harmonious and pilots are disproportionately favored by their relatively larger shares of the airspace and
economy. The senior airline captain's salary has remained two
to three times greater than the average controller's salary. All
around the controllers, other professionals, such as schoolteachers, firemen, and policemen, have been striking. The
controllers however, have been told by the government that,
despite their equally important and stressful work, they may
neither strike nor threaten to strike. In an age of militancy,
PATCO members, many of whom are Vietnam veterans, have
been alienated and many have more contempt than respect
for their FAA managers. To add to this frustration, various
Government reports have found the air traffic controller's job
to be both stressful and poorly supervised by higher management in the FAA.
On the other hand, ever since the formation of PATCO and
several other unions, which now represent 80% of FAA personnel, FAA managers have been confronted with managerial
problems of unprecedented intensity and magnitude. The air
traffic has continued to grow at a rapid rate. The FAA population is an aging one and various budget and manpower reductions have imposed constraints on the FAA in their management of the system. Although the FAA adopted the
recommendations of the Controller's Career Committee (the
Committee), in an earnest effort to improve its labor relations
posture, the struggle between the FAA and PATCO for final
authority to specify and control duties and responsibilties
continued. Legislation for early retirement and second career
training, recommended by the Committee, led to some improvements but was also subject to abuse.
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Many of the senior FAA managers are veterans of World
War II and Korea and have managed the system through authoritarian rather than consultative methods. Faced with Vietnam veterans, cynical toward authority, they have resented
and resisted more than they have led the work force, thereby
widening the alienation.
Each of the controllers signed an oath not to strike and,
through Government command and action by the courts,
there can be no doubt that each PATCO member was aware
of the risks involved in disobeying injunctions and violating
the law. Finally, the leaders appear to have misled their fellow
members into believing that all of them were indispensable to
the System, and that if all else failed they had some kind of
1980 campaign promise the Reagan administration would
honor. Accordingly, no one can claim surprise at the events
set in motion by PATCO on August 3, 1981.
QUESTIONS OF LAW AND POLICY

The facts of the dispute seem reasonably clear and are well
recorded in several jurisdictions. The legal questions seem
reasonably well defined and their answers easily ascertainable:
1) Did PATCO violate the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978?
2) Was PATCO in contempt of several Federal court injunctions relating to the dispute?
3) Could PATCO rely on the precedent of the FAA's 1972
rehiring of the PATCO controllers (while in contempt of
court) as an indication that the government would not enforce
the Anti-Strike Legislation?
4) Did the FAA bargain in good faith with PATCO?
5) Did the PATCO president actively lead his membership
toward accepting the bargain he had struck with Secretary of
Transportation Drew Lewis?
6) Were the remarks and actions of the President, the Secretary of State and the FAA administrator prejudicial of due
process and fair hearing?
7) Was decertification of PATCO in accord with the law
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and due process?
8) May striking controllers be denied reinstatement, as indicated by Federal officials, even though they have joined another union certificated to bargain for them?
The policy issues, however, are more complex and their answers are not easily ascertainable:
1) Does the punishment fit the crime?
2) Will another union be permitted to be certificated and
to bargain for the jobs of the controllers who may have been
misled and coerced by PATCO, or are the strikers banished
forever from their profession?
3) On what criteria could the FAA rehire some and refuse
others?
4) What organization and process will be established by
the FAA to handle legitimate grievances in the future?
5) Could the Federal Service Impasses Panel have settled
the dispute?
6) Why did the parties fail to use this alternative?
7) More fundamentally, in the light of the national experience to date, should air traffic controllers, like other national
security operating personnel in the Department of Defense,
Coast Guard, FBI, etc., be excluded from laws governing collective bargaining by other civil service personnel?
8) Pragmatically, the most important question of policy is:
How does the FAA modernize and manage the national airspace system so as to motivate these essential professional
men and women to control safely and surely the nation's air
traffic?

